1. Scope
The proposals in this document are offered
for consideration
by the Internet community and particularly
by ICANN's DNSO
Working Group C, Drafting Committee 1.
This committee has
been tasked to make recommendations concerning
new gTLD
deployment in the IANA-approved root zone.
2. Concepts
2a. Compromise
It is time to reunify and strengthen the
Internet's name
space. Rapid and broad expansion of the
number of IANA-
approved gTLDs should be pursued. I propose
starting with a
compromise aimed at integrating certain
non-IANA zones into
the legacy Internet name space.
The plan to increase the number of gTLDs
may be summarized
as follows: Settle disputes with operators
of zones which
have been the subject of divisive contests.
Begin gTLD
service for those zones first. Follow
by adding the TLD
candidates suggested to the IANA in 1995
and 1996.[1] Then
continue to augment the IANA root with
suggestions offered
by a broadly-based and informed Internet
community.
2b. Goals
Such expansion is intended to accelerate
the commodification
of domain names in ways that should preclude
any artificial
scarcity of names and thereby would expedite
the reduction
in price of domain name registration for
the consumer. It is
anticipated that price competition and
market
differentiation will become more pronounced
at the registrar
level as the number of commodity gTLDs
proliferates.
To reduce the likelihood that any future
regime of Internet
administration might seek to impose speech
or content
control through DNS management, and to
guarantee the
abundant availability of names in all
gTLDs, ICANN should
avoid models of gTLD differentiation which
restrict second
level domain name registrations within
particular gTLD
suffixes. This does not preclude the construction
of
specialized zones elsewhere in the Internet's
name space.
2c. Strategy
The first gTLD added to the listing of
the IANA-defined
legacy root should be .web.
I propose that verifiably current SLD registrations
now
listed in any non-IANA .web zones will
be "grandfathered"--
enfranchised in the IANA-approved .web
gTLD. The .web
operated by IODesign is apparently the
only such zone
currently offering commoditized service.
I furhter propose
that incentives be provided to encourage
the non-IANA zone
registry operators to join the ICANN-administered
system as
registrars.
This model should be followed in good faith
for domain name
holders in other publicly-offered non-IANA
zones so that the
Internet's name space will be as unified
as possible before
augmenting the legacy root with more gTLDs.
3. Commentary
3a. Coherence and Commodification in the Internet Name Space
The thrust of this proposal is to reunify
the Internet's
public name space by settling outstanding
claims to gTLD
zone authority.
Resolution of the controversy surrounding
.web must be given
priority. The issue has been a recurring
source of
political tension because the zone is
unusually attractive,
offering a very high potential for popularity
and market
success as a gTLD. The .web suffix was
among the very first
and most frequent new gTLD requests submitted
to Jon Postel
after NSI commodified domain name registrations
in September
1995 (These requests came separately from,
in order, Scott
Adams, Mike Lester, Chris Ambler, and
Craig Harkins[1]). It
was one of the seven new gTLDs designated
by the IAHC in
early 1997. And it has of course been
the subject of an
unsuccessful law suit by IODesign and
a long public campaign
waged by Chris Ambler, an officer of that
corporation.
My judgment as a long standing observer
of these events[2]
is that Mr. Ambler's claims to have been
granted authority
over .web by the IANA in July 1996 do
not hold up.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the
officers of IODesign
may reinitiate litigation if a .web zone
registry other than
theirs is added to the IANA-approved root.
ICANN must be
prepared for such a contingency in the
event this proposed
compromise is not accepted.
A suitable compromise must be both practical
and principled.
ICANN must confront this issue and seek
an amicable
resolution that is mutually satisfactory
to all parties for
the following reason: A coherent name
space is essential to
the integrity and stable operation of
Internet-based
communication.
Responsible administration of the Internet
therefore
requires integration of .web and other
existing publicly-
offered non-IANA zones into the legacy
root. The zone is
strategically valuable because of its
ready memorability as
a public Internet identifier. Nothing
is to be gained if it
were to be ignored or left idle, while
countless more months
or even years of dispute over its authority
would be costly
and unnecessary. Settlement of these disputes
will fortify
confidence in the strength and stability
of the IANA system
and will punctuate the transition to a
new era of reliable
and responsive Internet management.
Below I offer two scenarios for compromise.
Two are
necessary because another outstanding
policy matter must be
settled first: ICANN's endorsement of
a proprietary or a
shared registry model.
3b. Option 1: Implementing .web as a Proprietary TLD
Reunification of the Internet's name space
deserves higher
priority than preference for the non-profit
SRS business
model over the proprietary gTLD model.
It is better to see a
monopolized for-profit .web in the legacy
root rather than
no .web at all.
If a properly constituted ICANN board deems
a proprietary
gTLD model to be acceptable, there would
be no principled or
practical reason to deny existing non-IANA
zone
proprietorships admission into the legacy
root. Moreover,
it would be inappropriate and unfair to
focus on creating
new gTLD proprietorships in a market where
existing
proprietorships are still being denied
visibility in the
legacy roots. The proper course would
be to resolve disputes
for primacy between proprietorships which
claim authority
over identically named zones. If competing
parties can not
be reconciled, ICANN should establish
the sort of Fair
Hearing Councils which have been suggested
elsewhere.
3c. Option 2: Engineering the Transition to Shared gTLDs:
I have stated some arguments in support
of shared not-for-
profit TLDs elsewhere.[4] Regardless of
my own preference
for it, I do not believe a broad-based
and informed Internet
community has yet endorsed or rejected
this model. Nor would
I argue that the White Paper mandated
one model over the
other.
Yet it is clear that if a properly constituted
ICANN board
adopts the CORE type of non-profit registry
/ distributed
registrars model, the transition period
is bound to be
politically more complex and technically
less familiar than
simply expanding the number of monopoly
proprietorships.
NSI's legacy of rapid growth and high
profitability will
continue to tempt other businesses into
running their own
zone registries, even if this means offering
service outside
of the legacy root and undermining the
coherence and
operational stability of the Internet's
name space.
If ICANN commits to the shared registry
model, I propose
that ICANN should offer what might be
called a double
enfranchisement to the operators of contended
zones: 1)
Offer the zone proprietor an expedited
application to become
an ICANN-approved registrar, a generous
discount on any fees
required to attain registrar status, and
a temporary (30-90
day) opportunity to function as the exclusive
initial
registrar for that gTLD, and; 2) Offer
holders of domain
names within the zones at issue a free
year of inclusion the
IANA-approved shared registry.
The domain name holder's enfranchisement
can be referred to
as "grandfathering." In practice, this
funds the amount any
registrar would have to redeem to the
IANA-approved shared
registry for each domain name record.
This covers the
standard cost of maintaining the domain
name record as well
as any additional fees that might be required
by ICANN.
Grandfathering can play out in one of
two ways: 1) The
credit would be used to offset the ex-proprietor's
(and
newly constituted registrar's) cost of
listing the domain
name holder in the IANA-approved registry,
or; 2) In case
the proprietor is not willing to participate
in the ICANN
system, the credit would be used to enlist
an existing
ICANN-approved registrar to provide free
service for one
year to the domain holder. This encourages
the alternate
registrar to build a relationship with
the domain name
holder by effectively subsidizing the
fees the registrar
would be obliged to pay to list the record
in an IANA-
approved registry.
In either circumstance the existing domain
name holder will
be granted visibility to hundreds of millions
of users in
the legacy root as soon as possible.
The new gTLD would be introduced into the
IANA root in a way
that enhances coherence and operational
stability. Care must
be taken to avoid penalizing the holder
whose domain name is
being copied into the IANA-approved TLD.
In the best case,
if the existing zone proprietor becomes
an ICANN registrar,
the domain name holder would not be inconvenienced
in any
way. The holder can simply maintain its
relationship with
the registrar, or can choose a new registrar
if desired.
In the worst case, if the proprietor balks,
there might be
some confusion experienced by the domain
name holder as the
new circumstances become clear. In such
a case it would be
necessary to add the domain name record
and any available
contact information to the list of one
of the ICANN-approved
registrars. Then the domain name holder
would be notified
that one year of free service within the
IANA-approved gTLD
is being provided by way of that registrar.
The domain name
holder would then face the choice of sustaining
the
relationship with one or both of the zone
registrars. It is
safe to assume that the registration which
guarantees
visibility in the legacy root would be
more attractive.
This grandfathering strategy is designed
to smooth the
transition to a unified root. If successful
it will help
migrate as many as 40,000 registrants
from non-IANA zones
into gTLDs within the legacy root.
It intends no prejudice
or penalty against domain holders whose
zone proprietors in
the worst case may refuse to join the
legacy root, despite
being encouraged to join as registrars
under generous
circumstances. In other words, the compromise
is structured
to forge coherence in the Internet's domain
name space, so
that new gTLDs can be added under the
most auspicious
possible circumstances
Since the number of domain name holders
in non-IANA zones is
small, this registrant-subsidization and
registrar-discount
strategy will have a negligible impact
on the shared
registry's and ICANN's revenue streams.
The greatest cost
to all participants involves learning
the art of compromise.
It is a cost must be widely dispersed.
Nevertheless, it is
clear that the potential benefits of unifying
the Internet's
name space far outweigh the costs of sustaining
the present
conflict.
4. Contingencies:
If any of the suggestions introduced here
are ultimately
incorporated in the final product of this
drafting group,
their implementation should be deferred
pending ratification
by a fully constituted ICANN board. I
believe it is
necessary to first decide the question
of proprietary vs.
shared gTLD registries before determining
which compromise
to pursue, and that ICANN's current interim/initial
board is
not yet sufficiently representative of
the Internet
community to set this policy.
Notes
[1] Jon Postel. "The IANA's File of iTLD Requests."
http://www.gtld-mou.org/gtld-discuss/mail-archive/00990.html
[2] Craig Simon, Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Miami's
School of International Studies. A page relevant of links and
writings is available at http://flywheel.com/ircw/overview.html
.
[3] Pending the satisfaction of technical criteria pertaining to
the connectivity, interoperability, and scalability of the
registry, and perhaps social criteria pertaining to security and
inclusivity. These parameters are not fundamental to the scope
of
this proposal to Discussion Group C.
[4] Craig Simon. "My Response to the Green Paper."
http://www.flywheel.com/ircw/gpsubmit.html